## \*Disad Updates\*\*

### Midterms 2AC – Dems Losing Now

#### Democrats are losing now – Biden’s disapproval ratings are higher than ever.

**Lindsay 7-19** (James M. Lindsay, 7-19-2022, "A Midterm Election Update," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/midterm-election-update)

Back in March, I reviewed what we know about U.S. congressional midterm elections. The big takeaway was that the president’s party generally loses House seats, but not necessarily Senate seats. **That is especially true when the president is struggling in the polls**. With President Joe Biden’s approval rating at 42 percent eight months out from Election Day, that historical pattern was **bad news for Democrats and good news for Republicans**. The one bright spot for Democrats was that the decennial redistricting of House seats looked to be going in their favor. So where do things stand three and a half months from Election Day? **The picture appears to have gotten darker for the Democrats**—at least when it comes to holding onto the House. Biden’s average public approval rating now stands at 38 percent, and **his average disapproval rating at 57 percent**. To put those numbers in perspective, no elected president since World War II has been lower in the polls at this point in his presidency. (Scientific polling didn’t begin until the 1940s, so we can’t compare Biden’s numbers with, say, James Buchanan’s.) Barring a turn in events, Biden is more likely to hurt than help the chances of Democratic congressional candidates. The bad news doesn’t end there for Democrats. **The once-promising results of decennial redistricting have dimmed.** New York State’s Court of Appeals tossed out a redistricting plan drafted by the state’s Democratic-controlled legislature that would have added as many as three Democratic seats to New York’s congressional delegation. New York instead adopted a redistricting plan drawn up by a court-appointed special master that created more competitive districts and opened up the possibility that Republicans might gain seats. In Maryland, a court struck down the Democratic-controlled state legislature’s initial redistricting proposal as “extreme partisan gerrymandering.” The revised plan passed by the Maryland legislature likely will preserve the state’s one Republican congressional seat. Republicans, meanwhile, got good news on the redistricting front. The most significant development was in Florida, where Governor Ron DeSantis used his veto to force the Republican-controlled state legislature to abandon a redistricting plan that had only a slight Republican bias. After much back-and-forth, the legislature approved the plan that DeSantis drew up. It’s projected to give Florida Republicans four more House seats than they had under the old map.

#### Republicans are on track to winning both the House and the Senate.

**Roche 7-7** (Darragh Roche, 7-7-2022, "Democrats' worst case scenario for the midterms," Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/democrats-worst-case-scenario-midterms-joe-biden-republicans-1722543)

**Democrats are widely expected to suffer defeats in the upcoming 2022 midterm elections, with Republicans aiming to retake the House of Representatives and the Senate.** The serving president's party usually performs poorly during midterms and while **it seems likely President Joe Biden will see major losses this November**, it's not clear just how bad things will be for the Democrats. Polls suggest the **Democrats** are on course for disappointment and that the party **could potentially lose control of both chambers of Congress and see newly empowered Republican majorities stymying Biden's agenda in the run up to the next presidential election**. A GOP gain in either chamber would hamstring the Biden administration, but the worst case scenario would see comfortable Republican majorities in both chambers, potentially leading to a slew of investigations and possibly even impeachment of the president.

Losing the Senate

**Poll tracker FiveThirtyEight's 2022 election forecast rates the Senate as a toss up with 35 seats up for re-election**. Fourteen are currently held by Democrats and 21 by Republicans.

FiveThirtyEight gives Republicans an 80 percent chance of holding between 47 and 54 seats. If that latter figure is reached, **it would represent a major defeat for Biden's party.**

The Senate is currently divided between 50 Republicans, 48 Democrats and two independents who caucus with the Democrats. Vice President Kamala Harris has had to use her casting vote on a number of occasions and a single Democratic loss in the midterms would hand control to the Republicans.

FiveThirtyEight rates the Senate races in Arizona, Georgia, Nevada and Pennsylvania as toss-ups. **If Republicans can win all four, it would be a major loss for the Democrats.**

Three of those seats are held by incumbent Democrats, while Republican Senator Pat Toomey of Pennsylvania is retiring.

However, it's highly unlikely that Republicans could gain enough seats in November to secure a 60-vote, filibuster proof majority. This means Democrats are likely to deploy the filibuster if the GOP retakes the chamber.

Nonetheless, a Republican-led Senate could hold up Biden's judicial nominees and potentially prevent him filling any vacant seats that might arise on the U.S. Supreme Court, as Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell did in 2016 when he was majority leader.

A Republican House

**Republicans are favored to win the House,** according to FiveThirtyEight, while Democrats currently hold 220 seats to Republicans' 210, with five seats vacant.

The poll tracker's analysis gives Republicans an 80 percent chance of holding between 215 and 258 seats. If the larger figure proves accurate, that would be a huge gain for the GOP, though it remains an outside possibility.

The single worst midterm loss of House seats occurred in 2010 when Democrats lost 63 seats under then President Barack Obama. However, Obama's party retained control of the Senate until the 2014 midterms.

**It seems likely that Republican gains this year will be more modest but that the GOP will still win the House.** That will allow House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy to become speaker for the first time and possibly mean the end of Speaker Nancy Pelosi's political career.

FiveThirtyEight's generic congressional ballot shows Republicans with 44.8 percent support to the Democrats' 43.2 percent, as of July 6 - a margin of just 1.7 percent.

#### Republicans are widely expected to win despite minor fallbacks.

**Marriner and Reklaitis 7-22** (Katie Marriner, Victor Reklaitis, 7-22-2022, "Republicans still favored in midterm elections, but their chances for taking back Senate are dropping," MarketWatch, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/republicans-still-favored-in-midterm-elections-but-their-chances-for-taking-back-senate-are-dropping-11657887755)

**Republicans are widely expected to score wins in this November’s midterm elections, thanks in large part to Americans’ frustrations with raging inflation.** High prices for gasoline RB00, -0.05% and other essentials are helping to **keep President Joe Biden’s approval ratings low** — and giving a talking point for Republicans to use against Biden and his fellow Democrats. But the GOP’s odds for taking back control of the Senate have fallen significantly this month, as shown in the chart below that’s based on data from betting market PredictIt. They’re down to just above 60%, off from nearly 80% in mid-June. **Republicans’ odds for regaining the House haven’t seen that type of drop and remain strong, staying well above 80%.**

Odds

Here are the chances that Republicans or Democrats will have control of the...

Senate The decline in the GOP’s Senate odds has come as polls in some key races favor Democrats. In Pennsylvania’s Senate race, for example, polls have given Democratic candidate John Fetterman 6- and 9-point advantages over GOP nominee Mehmet Oz. In Georgia’s contest, incumbent Democratic Sen. Raphael Warnock has a 3-point edge over Republican candidate Herschel Walker, according to a RealClearPolitics average of surveys. **To be sure, the GOP still looks likely to take back the 50-50 Senate, which Democrats currently control only because Vice President Kamala Harris can cast tiebreaking votes. It’s tough for Democrats to keep their grip on the chamber** “in a situation where Senate outcomes correlate heavily with presidential job approval,” said Sean Trende, senior elections analyst for RealClearPolitics, in a column last week. “While Republican candidate quality is an issue, good analysis should not lose sight of the fact that environment matters as well, and probably more so these days,” Trende wrote. “While we should give more than a cursory nod to the possibility that Democrats will hold the Senate (unlike the possibility that Democrats will hold the House, which is barely worth that nod), **we should also say with some confidence that Republicans are the favorites to win**,” he also said. The additional charts below shows key Senate races to watch, as well as the performance of each party in a generic congressional ballot.

### Midterms 2AC – House GOP Winning

#### Republicans are winning the House now.

**Gonzales 7-14** (Nathan L. Gonzales, 7-14-2022, "Ratings show GOP taking House control, but no red wave — yet," Roll Call, https://rollcall.com/2022/07/14/ratings-show-gop-taking-house-control-but-no-red-wave-yet/)

ANALYSIS — **If the election were held today, it looks as if Republicans would gain seven House seats, according to Inside Elections’ individual race ratings.** While that would be enough for the majority, it certainly wouldn’t qualify as a red wave. **Still, that doesn’t mean Democrats can rest easy, and GOP gains are likely to be higher.** If you tally all the races rated as Solid Republican, Likely Republican, Lean Republican and Tilt Republican, and split the 18 Toss-up races evenly, **Republicans would have 221 seats. That would be a net gain of seven seats**. They need a net gain of only four for the majority. Of course, Republicans wouldn’t turn that down, but it would be a minuscule gain and a massive disappointment for the GOP because the expectations and current projections are high. Over the past century, the president’s party has lost an average of 30 House seats in midterm elections. Midterm elections are typically performance reviews on the sitting president, and Joe Biden’s job rating is in rough shape. He’s at 39 percent approve and 56 percent disapprove, according to the latest FiveThirtyEight average, with no sign of a rebound. **Seventy-five percent of Americans believe the country is on the wrong track**, compared with just 18 percent who believe the country is headed in the right direction, according to the RealClearPolitics average. **That’s usually not good for the party in power**, and Democrats control the executive and legislative branches of government. **When people are asked which party they want in control of Congress, Republicans have a 1.9-point lead**, according to the averages on FiveThirtyEight and on RealClearPolitics. At least one model, from Emory University professor Alan Abramowitz, suggests that a generic ballot lead of that size should power Republicans to a 19-seat gain in the House.

### Midterms 1NC – Dems Winning

#### Dems are closing up the gap because of Roe v. Wade.

**Landen 7-23** (Xander Landen, 7-23-2022, "Democrats narrow Congress poll gap to Republicans, closest for 6 months," Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/democrats-narrow-congress-poll-gap-republicans-closest-6-months-1727397)

Democrats are narrowing the gap with Republicans in polling ahead of this year's midterm congressional races, according to analysis from FiveThirtyEight. FiveThirtyEight, which compiles generic congressional ballot polls, shows that as of July 22, Republicans have a 1-point lead over Democrats, with 44.2 percent of voters saying that they'd back GOP candidates while 43.2 percent say they'd support Democrats. The latest numbers mark the closest the polling average has been since January, when surveys showed Republicans had only a slight advantage over Democrats. In early January, Republicans were up by only 0.5 percent in the polls. Republicans' lead grew in February to nearly 3 percent, according to FiveThirtyEight, before remaining at around 2 percent for months.

Democrats Narrow Congress Poll Gap to Republicans

Democrats are narrowing the gap with Republicans in polling ahead of the 2022 midterm congressional races, according to analysis from FiveThirtyEight. Above, a voter casts her ballot at a polling station during the midterm primary election on June 21 in Alexandria, Virginia. On July 4, FiveThirtyEight analysis showed Republicans with 44.8 percent support on the generic congressional ballot Democrats enjoyed support from 42.8 percent of Americans—a lead of 2 percent for the GOP. It's unclear what has led to the narrowing in polling averages. However, some analysts have suggested that the Supreme Court's decision overturning the landmark abortion-rights ruling Roe v. Wade in June could help Democrats win in the midterms. Rebecca J. Kreitzer, associate professor of public policy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, told Newsweek this month that the development may help "mobilize support" for Democratic candidates more than Republican ones. "Time will tell if Democrats are about to maintain the current levels of outrage among the mass public. The news cycle moves incredibly fast in this era," Kreitzer said. "However, this is the first time in our history that a fundamental constitutional right was taken away."\

#### Now is key for the Dems – GOP approval rates are plummeting.

**Ramos 7-15** (Kristian Ramos, 7-15-2022, "Democrats' time to pounce: Republicans suddenly find themselves vulnerable ahead of midterms ," Salon, <https://www.salon.com/2022/07/15/democrats-time-to-pounce-suddenly-find-themselves-vulnerable-ahead-of-midterms/>)

With the approval of the Republican Party plummeting and gas and commodity prices declining, Democrats suddenly have an opportunity to go on offense this midterm cycle by touting the success of the pandemic recovery — and contrasting that with the draconian proposals offered by the alternative.

To do this, Democrats must center the innovation and grit of the American people and show how we are transitioning from a rapid recovery to sustainable growth. Republicans, by contrast, have devolved into a cult beholden to Donald Trump, doubling down on their support for him despite the shocking revelations of the January 6 commission.

Should they retake Congress, Republicans' economic plan consists of taxing the lower and middle class and offering no solution for dealing with inflation. **The one thing they can claim credit for, successfully striking down Roe V. Wade, is one of the most wildly unpopular actions ever taken by the Supreme Court.** The Supreme Court's decision to **overturn Roe is driving voter motivation for Democrats.** 62% of voters say they are more motivated to vote in November after the decision. 62% say they are more motivated to vote for Democrats, including 55% of Independents. Just 27% say it makes them more likely to vote for Republicans in November.

According to veteran Democrat political strategist Simon Rosenberg, recent polling data suggests the race has moved 3-5 points to the Democrats in recent weeks. 11 polls have been released on the generic congressional perference since Roe ended. Seven of the 11 polls — more than half — **show meaningful movement towards the Democrats and give significant leads in the generic polling.**

In new comprehensive polls of battleground states, Future Majority found the generic ballot for congressional preference shifting from 43 Democrat - 45 Republican in March to 44-42 now, a four-point swing. Another new survey of voters from Navigator finds a 24 point drop in GOP favorability with independents and 10 points overall. This shift is very significant in a short time and further confirms data that the national landscape is suddenly becoming better for Democrats.

A review of recent Senate polling suggests that if the election were held today, Democrats would retain the Senate and perhaps even pick up a few seats. The New York Times gave a significant Senate overview, which showed that in Arizona, Georgia, New Hampshire, and Nevada, Democrats are leading their GOP counterparts. With Republicans cratering with Independents and Democrats consistently leading in the generic ballot, it is a new, competitive cycle. Democrats now must seize this moment and make our case to voters about how left-leaning policies have strengthened our country's economy.

In 2020 the economy was in free fall. The racial employment gap was historically high. We have closed that gap today, adding 372,000 jobs to a strong labor market in June. The unemployment rate is currently 3.6% for the fourth month, just above a 50-year low. Average hourly wages grew 5.1% in June compared to last year. President Biden has created 4.5 times more jobs in 17 months than the previous 3 GOP Presidents combined over 16 years.

Gas and commodity prices have finally begun to decrease, in a needed reprieve from rising inflation and a hopeful sign that it may be starting to level off. Crude oil has fallen more than 8% and is trading at less than $100 per barrel for the first time since early May. U.S. oil production is at an all-time high, and the national average gas price declined for the third week after increasing following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The average price of a gallon of gas is now sitting at about $4.70, more than 33 cents less than when prices peaked last month.

While commodity and gas prices continue to drop, we are increasing domestic economic output. The construction of new manufacturing facilities in the U.S. has soared 116% over the past year, dwarfing the 10% gain on all building projects combined. Massive chip factories are being built in Phoenix: Intel is making two outside the city. Aluminum and steel plants are being erected all across the south. This new semiconductor and steel output will help increase economic productivity domestically. Perhaps the most obvious sign that things are improving: this July, the baby formula plant at the center of recent shortages reopened this month. Finally, our global supply chain is improving; $ 20,000 container import costs are now down to $10,000, and shipping times are down by 35%. While we are not yet back to pre-pandemic times, things are trending in the right direction.

Democrats have helped lead a strong recovery and have made critical investments in our economy and the American people. They have effectively led Americans through tough challenges – COVID, Ukraine, and the ups and downs of the economy.

#### Roe v Wade is helping the Democrats – they’ll slowly getting closer to a win.

**Walker 6-30** (Chris Walker, 6-30-2022, “Dems Close Gap on GOP in Midterm Poll Following Supreme Court’s Upending of Roe”, https://truthout.org/articles/dems-close-gap-on-gop-in-midterm-poll-following-supreme-courts-upending-of-roe/)

New polling continues to show that the 2022 midterm election outcome will be a close one, as both Democratic and Republican parties appear to be in a statistical tie on who voters prefer to run Congress next term.

**The Supreme Court’s decision to end abortion rights protections appears to be helping Democrats’ numbers.**

In an Emerson College poll published on Friday, respondents were asked who they would vote for today, if the midterms were happening right now. Voters were split nearly evenly on the question, with 43.7 percent saying they’d back the Democratic candidate in their House race versus 44.7 percent saying they’d prefer the Republican candidate to win.

The 1 point difference is within the survey’s 2.9 point margin of error, which means the two parties are essentially tied, according to the poll.

Both parties’ voters appear equally motivated to vote, with 93.4 percent of Democratic-leaning voters saying they are very or somewhat motivated, and 93.2 percent of Republican-leaning voters saying the same.

Although showcasing a statistical tie between the two major parties, **the news is probably more welcomed by Democrats**, as Emerson College polls throughout the year have suggested Republicans were likely to lead in the midterms. In February, Republicans led Democrats by 9 points**, but that lead has gradually shrunk over the intervening months**.

Those supporting Democrats appear to be motivated in large part by the Supreme Court’s upending of abortion rights recognitions in a decision issued last month. According to Spencer Kimball, executive director of Emerson College Polling, “**those who say abortion is the top issue facing the nation are more motivated to vote this November than any other issue group.”**

“Among the nearly 1 in 10 voters for whom abortion is the top issue, 89% are very motivated to vote this November; comparatively, 76% of voters who say the economy is the top issue are very motivated to vote,” Kimball said, adding that “voters who say abortion is the most important issue break for the Democratic congressional candidate over Republicans 80% to 8%.”

The new polling numbers suggest it will be a tight race**, though prognosticators continue to say that the midterms are the GOP’s to lose**. Typically, the party of an incumbent president tends to lose seats in the first midterm of their tenure — **but this year appears to be an atypical one, as this and other polls have shown.**

### Midterms 1NC – AT: Trump ahead now

#### Trump is slightly ahead now but the tables are turning because of abortion rights and gun control.

**Cohn 7-16** (Nate Cohn, 7-16-2022, "The Key Insights From Our First Poll of the 2022 Midterms," The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/16/upshot/poll-analysis-2022-midterms.html)

Which side has the most energy heading into November? More polls will come as the midterm elections near, but for now we’ve wrapped up our first New York Times/Siena survey, and here are some notable takeaways: Voters are not happy. Just 13 percent of registered voters said America was heading in the right direction. Only 10 percent said the economy was excellent or good. And a majority of voters said the nation was too politically divided to solve its challenges. As a point of comparison, each of these figures shows a more pessimistic electorate than in October 2020, when the pandemic was still raging and Donald J. Trump was president. Joe Biden is in trouble. His approval rating in our poll was in the low 30s. That’s lower than we ever found for Mr. Trump. Democrats would rather see someone else get the party’s nomination in 2024. Mr. Biden’s age was as much of an issue among voters as his overall job performance. Of course, he probably would have trailed “someone else” ahead of the last presidential primary as well, but he still won the nomination because his opposition was weak or fractured. Still, it’s a sign that Mr. Biden is much weaker than the typical president seeking re-election. It could augur a contested primary. Democrats’ Reasons for a Different Candidate What’s the most important reason you would prefer someone other than Joe Biden to be the Democratic Party’s 2024 presidential nominee? Asked of 191 respondents who said they planned to vote in the 2024 Democratic primary and who preferred a candidate other than Joe Biden in a New York Times/Siena College poll from July 5-7, 2022.By The New York Times **Trump isn’t doing great, either. Like Mr. Biden, Mr. Trump has become less popular over the last two years.** The number of Republicans who hold an unfavorable view of him has doubled since our final polling in 2020. He’s now under 50 percent in a hypothetical 2024 Republican primary matchup. Gov. Ron DeSantis of Florida is already at 25 percent in an early test of the Republican primary. Mr. Trump may still be the front-runner, but the polls increasingly look more like the early surveys from the Democratic primary in 2008 — when Hillary Clinton found herself in an extremely close race and ultimately lost to Barack Obama — than the polls ahead of the Democratic primary in 2016, when she won a protracted battle against Bernie Sanders. Many voters do not want to see a 2020 rematch. Mr. Biden still led Mr. Trump in a hypothetical 2024 matchup, 44 percent to 41 percent. What was surprising: Ten percent of respondents volunteered that they would not vote at all or would vote for someone else if those were the two candidates, even though the interviewer didn’t offer those choices as an option. The midterm race starts out close, with voters nearly evenly divided on the generic congressional ballot (voters are asked whether they prefer Democrats or Republicans to be in control of Congress). That’s a little surprising, given expectations of a Republican landslide this year.

What is your preference for the outcome of the 2022 congressional elections?

Democratic control41%

Republican control40%

Other19%

Based on a New York Times/Siena College poll of 849 registered voters from July 5-7. The news is helping Democrats. The news has been bad for Democrats, from recent court rulings to their frustrations in trying to stop mass shootings, but for the moment it may be helping the Democratic Party. **Around 30 percent of voters combined said topics related to guns, abortion and democracy were the most important problem facing the country, and Democrats had a wide lead among these voters.** **It’s a big change from earlier in the cycle**, when immigration, crime and questions about school curriculums seemed likely to dominate the campaign — and help Republicans. **Support for abortion rights is up in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision to overturn Roe v. Wade.** **Sixty-five percent said they thought abortion should be completely or mostly legal, up from 60 percent** in the last Times/Siena poll that asked about the issue, in September 2020.

### DSCA 2NC – Link UQ

#### New DSCA initiatives require more human resources and oversight—the plan trades off

Marcus Weisgerber 22, 6-30-2022, "Pentagon Agency Wants to Send Arms Monitors to Ukraine," Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/06/pentagon-agency-wants-send-arms-monitors-ukraine/368867/

DSCA, the agency in charge of foreign US arms sales, currently has no on-the-ground access to US-donated weapons to Ukraine and whether they are being used as intended. This was stated by Jed Royal, deputy director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency [DSCA] to journalists during a round table meeting last Thursday [June 30]. Due to the war in Ukraine, no toolkit works as it did in peacetime, i.e. going to a foreign country, opening military warehouses, tracking serial numbers, the state of weaponry, its availability, etc. Royal confirmed the view that currently in this situation, DSCA officials are “somewhat limited” in their ability to carry out more robust monitoring of weapons supplied to Ukraine. BulgarianMilitary.com recalls that in recent weeks there have been allegations of illegal arms trade during wartime. As we wrote, sources claim that Ukraine sold Russia two self-propelled French Caesar howitzers. Ukraine [France too] rejects this claim. Last month, a Javelin anti-tank guided missile system appeared for sale on the darknet, with the place of purchase being Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine. Jed Royal told reporters that officials will have to be more creative in carrying out their duties, but only if the agency sends more people into the field to conduct inspections. “Once we have more people in the country, we should be in a position to actually go do more physical validation [and] verification, going forward,” he said. “That’s the kind of thing that we’re looking for here. It still won’t be like a peacetime environment for it. So we’re going to have to get creative in how we do this.” It has not yet been decided how and when DSCA officials will begin inspections of weapons delivered to Ukraine. Royal is hoping to get a cooperation office in Ukraine to house examiners, a practice worldwide carried out by the agency. However, Royal does not want to send a “task force”. Ukraine received M30/M31 rockets with 51lb of PBX-109 high explosives Photo credit: Think Defence Jed Royal said that at the moment the only verification being done was on credibility – assurances from the Ukrainians that were given to DSCA agents and described them as “very solid and satisfactory”. Congress wants the same BulgarianMilitary.com recalls that currently, Ukraine has received US$6 billion worth of military equipment as military aid. US President Joe Biden almost once a month announces a new package of weapon systems, ammunition, and consumables that the US is ready to give to Ukraine, thereby increasing the revenge against Ukraine.While Congress has been broadly supportive of security assistance to Ukraine, lawmakers across the political spectrum — including Sens. Rand Paul, R-Ky., and Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass. — have raised concerns about the department’s seeming lack of oversight

### DSCA 1NC Link —Piolet Projects

#### Piolet programs cost DSCA’s time and money

Idrees Ali 16, 8-11-2016, "U.S. approves sale of bombs to NATO under pilot project," No Publication, https://sports.yahoo.com/news/u-approves-sale-bombs-nato-182401360.html?guccounter=1

WASHINGTON, Aug 11 (Reuters) - The U.S. State Department has approved the potential sale of precision guided munitions and equipment worth $231 million to NATO's support and procurement agency, under a pilot program where the organization acts as a lead buyer for member countries, the Pentagon said on Thursday.

The U.S. government last year announced a two-year project aimed at making it easier for NATO and member countries to share costs and buy weapons as a group as they struggle to stretch scarce defense budgets.

U.S. arms sales have historically been conducted with individual countries rather than alliances, in part because of concern about transfers of technology to third parties.

But group procurements could help NATO meet U.S. demands for NATO members to bolster spending on defense.

The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which implements foreign arms sales, said the weapons would be transferred to eight countries including Spain, Portugal and Denmark.

"The proposed sale improves NATO members' capability to meet current and future ground threats with precision," the agency said.

Boeing Co and Raytheon Co will be the principal contractors for the sale, the agency said in a notice to lawmakers posted on its website.

### DSCA Impact- Russia victory

#### Victory in Russia would cause broader destabilization in Europe

#### Fix and Kimmage 22(Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage, Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, Professor of History at the Catholic University of America, 2-18-2022, Foreign Affairs, “What if Russia Wins”,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-18/what-if-russia-wins?check\_logged\_in=1&utm\_medium=promo\_email&utm\_source=lo\_flows&utm\_campaign=registered\_user\_welcome&utm\_term=email\_1&utm\_content=20220722)

If Russia gains control of Ukraine or manages to destabilize it on a major scale, a new era for the United States and for Europe will begin. U.S. and European leaders would face the dual challenge of rethinking European security and of not being drawn into a larger war with Russia. All sides would have to consider the potential of nuclear-armed adversaries in direct confrontation. These two responsibilities—robustly defending European peace and prudently avoiding military escalation with Russia—will not necessarily be compatible. The United States and its allies could find themselves deeply unprepared for the task of having to create a new European security order as a result of Russia’s military actions in Ukraine.

For Russia, victory in Ukraine could take various forms. As in Syria, victory does not have to result in a sustainable settlement. It could involve the installation of a compliant government in Kyiv or the partition of the country. Alternatively, the defeat of the Ukrainian military and the negotiation of a Ukrainian surrender could effectively transform Ukraine into a failed state. Russia could also employ devastating cyberattacks and disinformation tools, backed by the threat of force, to ~~cripple~~[weaken] the country and induce regime change. With any of these outcomes, Ukraine will have been effectively detached from the West.

If Russia achieves its political aims in Ukraine by military means, Europe will not be what it was before the war. Not only will U.S. primacy in Europe have been qualified; any sense that the European Union or NATO can ensure peace on the continent will be the artifact of a lost age. Instead, security in Europe will have to be reduced to defending the core members of the EU and NATO. Everyone outside the clubs will stand alone, with the exception of Finland and Sweden. This may not necessarily be a conscious decision to end enlargement or association policies; but it will be de facto policy. Under a perceived siege by Russia, the EU and NATO will no longer have the capacity for ambitious policies beyond their own borders.

The United States and Europe will also be in a state of permanent economic war with Russia. The West will seek to enforce sweeping sanctions, which Russia is likely to parry with cyber-measures and energy blackmailing, given the economic asymmetries. China might well stand on Russia’s side in this economic tit for tat. Meanwhile, domestic politics in European countries will resemble a twenty-first-century great game, in which Russia will be studying Europe for any breakdown in the commitment to NATO and to the transatlantic relationship. Through methods fair and foul, Russia will take whatever opportunity comes its way to influence public opinion and elections in European countries. Russia will be an anarchic presence—sometimes real, sometimes imagined—in every instance of European political instability.

Cold War analogies will not be helpful in a world with a Russianized Ukraine. The Cold War border in Europe had its flash points, but it was stabilized in a mutually acceptable fashion in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. By contrast, Russian suzerainty over Ukraine would open a vast zone of destabilization and insecurity from Estonia to Poland to Romania to Turkey. For as long as it lasts, Russia’s presence in Ukraine will be perceived by Ukraine’s neighbors as provocative and unacceptable and, for some, as a threat to their own security. Amid this shifting dynamic, order in Europe will have to be conceived of in primarily military terms—which, since Russia has a stronger hand in the military than in the economic realm, will be in the Kremlin’s interest—sidelining nonmilitary institutions such as the European Union.

Russia has Europe’s largest conventional military, which it is more than ready to use. The EU’s defense policy—in contrast to NATO’s—is far from being able to provide security for its members. Thus will military reassurance, especially of the EU’s eastern members, be key. Responding to a revanchist Russia with sanctions and with the rhetorical proclamation of a rules-based international order will not be sufficient.

#### Russian victory hurts Germany and tanks the global economy

#### Fix and Kimmage 22 (Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage, Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, Professor of History at the Catholic University of America, 2-18-2022, Foreign Affairs, “What if Russia Wins”,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-18/what-if-russia-wins?check\_logged\_in=1&utm\_medium=promo\_email&utm\_source=lo\_flows&utm\_campaign=registered\_user\_welcome&utm\_term=email\_1&utm\_content=20220722)

In the event of a Russian victory in Ukraine, Germany‘s position in Europe will be severely challenged. Germany is a marginal military power that has based its postwar political identity on the rejection of war. The ring of friends it has surrounded itself with, especially in the east with Poland and the Baltic states, risks being destabilized by Russia. France and the United Kingdom will assume leading roles in European affairs by virtue of their comparatively strong militaries and long tradition of military interventions. The key factor in Europe, however, will remain the United States. NATO will depend on U.S. support as will the anxious and imperiled countries of Europe’s east, the frontline nations arrayed along a now very large, expanded, and uncertain line of contact with Russia, including Belarus and the Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine.

Eastern member states, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, will likely have substantial numbers of NATO troops permanently stationed on their soil. A request from Finland and Sweden to gain an Article 5 commitment and to join NATO would be impossible to reject. In Ukraine, EU and NATO countries will never recognize a new Russian-backed regime created by Moscow. But they will face the same challenge they do with Belarus: wielding sanctions without punishing the population and supporting those in need without having access to them. Some NATO members will bolster a Ukrainian insurgency, to which Russia will respond by threatening NATO members.

Ukraine’s predicament will be very great. Refugees will flee in multiple directions, quite possibly in the millions. And those parts of the Ukrainian military that are not directly defeated will continue fighting, echoing the partisan warfare that tore apart this whole region of Europe during and after World War II.

The permanent state of escalation between Russia and Europe may stay cold from a military perspective. It is likely, though, to be economically hot. The sanctions put on Russia in 2014, which were connected to formal diplomacy (often referred to as the “Minsk” process, after the city in which the negotiations were held), were not draconian. They were reversible as well as conditional. Following a Russian invasion of Ukraine, new sanctions on banking and on technology transfer would be significant and permanent. They would come in the wake of failed diplomacy and would start at “the top of the ladder,” according to the U.S. administration. In response, Russia will retaliate, quite possibly in the cyber-domain as well as in the energy sector. Moscow will limit access to critical goods such as titanium, of which Russia has been the world’s second-largest exporter. This war of attrition will test both sides. Russia will be ruthless in trying to get one or several European states to back away from economic conflict by linking a relaxation in tension to these countries’ self-interest, thus undermining consensus in the EU and NATO.

Europe’s strong suit is its economic leverage. Russia’s asset will be any source of domestic division or disruption in Europe or in Europe’s transatlantic partners. Here Russia will be proactive and opportunistic. If a pro-Russian movement or candidate shows up, that candidate can be encouraged directly or indirectly. If an economic or political sore point diminishes the foreign policy efficacy of the United States and its allies, it will be a weapon for Russian propaganda efforts and for Russian espionage.

Much of this is already happening. But a war in Ukraine will up the ante. Russia will use more resources and be unchained in its choice of instruments. The massive refugee flows arriving in Europe will exacerbate the EU’s unresolved refugee policy and provide fertile ground for populists. The holy grail of these informational, political, and cyberbattles will be the 2024 presidential election in the United States. Europe’s future will depend on this election. The election of Donald Trump or of a Trumpian candidate might destroy the transatlantic relationship at Europe’s hour of maximum peril, putting into question NATO’s position and its security guarantees for Europe.

### DSCA AT: Ukraine Impact

#### More aid to Ukraine coming now

**Merchant 22** (Nomaan Merchant, reporter for PBS, PBS News Hours, “U.S. sends an additional $270 million in military aid to Ukraine”, 7-22-2022, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-sends-an-additional-270-million-in-military-aid-to-ukraine)

WASHINGTON (AP) — The White House announced Friday that the U.S. is sending an additional $270 million in security assistance to Ukraine, a package that will include additional medium range rocket systems and tactical drones. The latest tranche brings the total U.S. security assistance committed to Ukraine by the Biden administration to $8.2 billion, and is being paid for through $40 billion in economic and security aid for Ukraine approved by Congress in May. The new package includes four High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS and will allow Kyiv to acquire up to 580 Phoenix Ghost drones, both crucial weapon systems that have allowed the Ukrainians to stay in the fight despite Russian artillery supremacy, according to John Kirby, the White House National Security Council’s coordinator for strategic communications. The latest assistance also includes some 36,000 rounds of artillery ammunition and additional ammunition for the HIMARS. “The president has been clear that we’re going to continue to support the government of Ukraine and its people for as long as it takes,” Kirby said. Ukrainian forces have used U.S.-made rocket launchers and tactical drones to destroy dozens of Russian targets and hold at bay Russia’s larger and more heavily equipped forces.

### DSCA 2NC – K2 Win Ukraine

#### DSCA key to victory in Ukraine

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. **Austin** III; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army General Mark A. **Milley 22** (U.S. Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army General Mark A. Milley Hold a Press Conference”, 7- 20-2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3100301/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-sta/)

As you heard me say, we're also committed to providing two NASAMS air defense systems to help Ukraine protect its troops and its civilians from Russian missile attacks. And we're committed to sending more HIMARS munitions and precision-guided artillery ammunition and other vital support. The United States will continue to push and to lead. You see that yet again in our next new presidential drawdown of weapons and equipment to help Ukraine defend itself, which we'll announce later this week. It will be our sixteenth drawdown of equipment from DOD inventory since August 2021. It will include four more HIMARS advanced rocket systems for a total of 16. The Ukrainians have made excellent use of HIMARS and you can see the impact on the battlefield. And the new package will also include additional GMLRS, and that's -- those are the rockets that -- that are used on a HIMARS. And we'll also provide more rounds of artillery ammunition. Now we're not working just to provide security assistance in the short term. One key theme of today's discussion was ensuring that Ukraine can sustain the fight to defend itself and its citizens. So we're even more focused on Ukraine's near-term needs -- as we're even more focused on Ukraine's near-term needs, we're also looking ahead to provide Ukraine with the capabilities that it will need for deterrence and self-defense over the longer term.

### DSCA 2AC – Turn

#### DSCA increasing security cooperation weakens already fragile states and causes democratic backsliding

Barbara Salera 22, 7-18-2022, "The Case Against Security Cooperation in Fragile States," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2022/07/the-case-against-security-cooperation-in-fragile-states/

A dark cloud hangs over the Department of Defense. After the “strategic failure” that was Afghanistan, the department is struggling to figure out how not to repeat it. In particular, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the lead agency for advising, training, and equipping foreign governments, has taken a number of key steps to prevent this from reoccurring. My fellow colleagues in the agency, whose key mission is to build the military capacity of foreign partners, took the collapse in Afghanistan particularly hard. After the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act the agency established certification programs for its workforce and introduced new concepts such as “building capacity” and “full-spectrum capability.” This is in addition to various other initiatives, such as changing security cooperation planning methods and requiring the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of outcomes. Though these initiatives predate the recent events in Afghanistan, they symbolize a widespread recognition of a problem with how the United States conducts military assistance, a recognition grimly underscored by the collapse of the Afghan security forces in August 2021 and the failures of Iraqi reconstruction. BECOME A MEMBER For years, the United States has struggled with how best to build foreign militaries, with minor successes here and there but nothing substantial over the long term. These noted difficulties have led to what Jahara Matisek has called the “Faberge Egg army problem, an expensively built military … easily broken by insurgents.” Some have argued that to address these poor outcomes the United States should consolidate and simplify the complicated domestic processes used to execute security cooperation, in addition to augmenting programs by building the capacity of formal defense institutions. However, military assistance outcomes will not improve simply by making the foreign military sales process faster or by improving a country’s defense institutions, as argued by Jeremy Gwinn. Many past articles on security cooperation focused on the minutiae of how to improve the process as opposed to asking whether security cooperation is the best means by which to accomplish national security objectives. Security cooperation analyses have a tendency to focus on the “tactical” level of security cooperation and concentrate on how to get the equipment to countries faster, or what other augmentations or incentives the United States should add to make it work. My argument focuses on the strategic use of security cooperation to accomplish wider American interests in fragile states. By fragile states, I specifically reference those countries that are dealing with “extensive corruption and criminal behavior, inability to collect taxes or otherwise draw on citizen support, large-scale involuntary dislocation of the population, sharp economic decline, group-based inequality, institutionalized persecution or discrimination, severe demographic pressures, brain drain, and environmental decay.” Rather than being a key foreign policy tool, the United States should carefully consider the ramifications of increasing security cooperation in fragile states. For one, the partner nation will likely be unable to sustain this newfound military capacity. Second, miliary assistance is likely to lead to an increase in political instability, corruption, human-rights abuses, and incidences of political oppression. This is because, at its core, the U.S. approach to security cooperation is contradictory and anachronistic. It is based on faulty assumptions about conditions in partner nations, often designed to defeat an enemy the partner nation does not have, and rooted in American models of defense institutions that do not exist. Even during the era of great-power competition, it is not clear that U.S. interests are best served by sending millions of dollars in defense articles and training to fragile states under the guise of “regional stability,” with the primary purpose of keeping Russia and China out. Inherent in the definition of security cooperation are explicit goals to “build capacity,” which often translate to ensuring that foreign countries can use, maintain, and sustain the equipment that the United States has transferred to them, either through grant assistance or by foreign military sales. Given the internal instability of fragile states, most military capabilities that the United States is seeking to foster are for the purposes of internal defense, counter-insurgency, or counter-terrorism. The suite of programs used to transfer training and equipment are referred to as “building partner capacity” or “train and equip programs.” Often recipients of these programs are states that cannot or will not provide basic services for their population or control their own territory, because the government lacks either the resources, the authority, or the trust of many of its citizens. While the state exists de jure, there is no state de facto. The idea of transferring millions of dollars of state-of-the-art American equipment to a country that cannot provide the most basic services to its population seems counter-intuitive. How is the recipient country expected to maintain it? While the issue of sustainment is important, let’s sidestep it and focus on what happens after the equipment is delivered and the training has been completed. There may be anecdotal evidence of how security cooperation programs have been “successful” in building military capacity, but numerous commentaries and studies argue that the outcomes of this newfound capacity have been less than ideal. According to these studies, an increase in security cooperation and security assistance correlated with an increased incidence of military coups, political oppression, human-rights violations, and other forms of political instability. For example, a 2020 study conducted by Patricia Sullivan, Leo Blanken, and Ian Rice analyzing post-conflict countries between 1956 and 2012 found a statistically significant increase in incidences of torture, extra-judicial killings, disappearances, political imprisonment and executions, and incidents of genocide among recipients of military assistance. A second study, analyzing U.S. security assistance to 150 countries, found a similar result: An increase in military assistance (security cooperation) correlated with worse performance on human rights. Both of these studies include years in which United States security cooperation programs were tied to Leahy Amendment conditions concerning human rights that barred sending material to units on a human-rights watch list and having every recipient of training vetted. Regardless, the results of these studies should not be surprising. Fragile states in which leaders lack resources to provide basic services for their population often turn to well-resourced (thanks to military assistance) militaries to repress restless populations and target political opponents. Political leaders in fragile states often use newfound military capacity to shore up power. Moreover, if political leaders can depend on an outside donor, like the United States, to resource their military, as opposed to taxes or some other internal resources, it further severs the tie between the government and its citizens. Regardless of these outcomes, the primary purpose of security cooperation is “to build partner nation capacity consistent with [American] defense objectives.” While the National Defense Strategy outlines numerous defense objectives, in regions with fragile states these objectives often include promoting regional stability, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, and even policing (countering human trafficking and drug trafficking). Therefore, the purpose of building military capacity in weak and failed states is mostly to ensure the internal security of that state. However, the American military, by law and tradition, is not designed to play an internal security role. When the United States has engaged in building foreign militaries, it has tended to reflect the American way of war centered around playing its economic strength and technological advantage into a tactical advantage on the battlefield. From doctrine to defense institutions and logistics systems, the entire Department of Defense is built around this American way of war. In fact, for U.S. forces counter-insurgency was a subset of total war until the late 2000s. Through building partner capacity programs, especially those under Department of Defense authorities, the approach to security cooperation has been to mirror American ways of war, doctrine, logistics systems, and training by asking American military members and institutions to help to build the capacity of defense institutions. In Afghanistan in particular, the Department of Defense sought to build a military “that was modeled on the centralized command structures and complex bureaucracy of the Defense Department” rather than build a military to defeat the specific threat(s) that Afghanistan faces rooted in defense institutions that Afghanistan could support. The U.S. implementers drew on what they knew, which resulted in Afghan forces not being able to function without American support operationally and logistically. Ultimately, once the United States withdrew, the Afghan forces fell quickly. U.S. security practitioners specializing in institutional capacity-building point to Afghanistan as an example of not taking institutional capacity-building seriously, therefore dooming the rebuilding of the Afghan military, and not necessarily of broader security cooperation failure. Congress listened, and required frequently used security cooperation programs to address institutional capacity-building, which advocates argue can even help to prevent human rights abuses, mostly through education or some sort of subject-matter expert or military advisor exchanges. However, institutional capacity-building is not the panacea to the security cooperation dilemma that many within the Department of Defense think it is. Institutional capacity-building programs still focus on the technical aspects of institutions, or give cursory education on issues such as the law of armed conflict. But these programs fail to consider the politics of how authority within states emerges, develops, or changes in order to institutionalize these newly introduced practices. To be clear, I am not arguing that security cooperation planners do not consider politics at all. In fact, U.S. law requires the Department of Defense to “jointly consider political, social, economic, diplomatic, and historical factors, if any, of the foreign country that may impact the effectiveness of the program.” However, assessments of these factors are often shallow and concentrate on the politics of formal institutions, overlooking the importance of informal institutions and how power and authority is actually wielded in fragile states. In order to understand the deep politics of fragile states, it is crucial to have an understanding of what a state is. The noted sociologist Max Weber defined the state as a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” The key for the Weberian conception of the state is the term legitimate use of force. Weber argued that even states that appear to be authoritarian will seek to root their claim of legitimacy in one of three “pure” types of authority: legal, traditional, or charismatic. Authority in the American state most closely aligns itself with legal legitimation, meaning that U.S. citizens see the American state and government as legitimate because a leader’s power is derived from written laws, procedures, and regulations. Leaders in fragile states often try to legitimize their rule not through legal means, but in a sub-categorization of traditional authority: the neo-patrimonial system. Leaders in neo-patrimonial states, while having a veneer of bureaucracy, also seek to remain in power through clientelism, or the exchange of goods and services for political support. Neo-patrimonial governments also prefer to keep state institutions weak by stacking bureaucracies, like defense institutions, with supporters and encouraging competition amongst individuals to keep them divided and therefore not a threat to their rule. This allows key military leaders to be dependent on the ruler for their wealth while also keeping “national armies divided and faction-ridden.” U.S. military assistance is especially prone to contribute to corruption as often this assistance accounts for a large portion of defense budgets. “Ghost soldiers” (nonexistent military personnel manufactured by corrupt officials to pocket their salary) in Iraq and Uganda are two well-known examples of how easy it can be for military institutions to engage in corruption. Clientelism is not considered corruption, but just the way governance is done in states in which the central government competes with local actors for legitimacy. The Taliban understood this and struck deals “with low-level representatives of the standing Afghan government through bribes or safety guarantees” in order to quickly seize control of various regions. With this understanding of the state, a deeper look into the approach to institutional capacity-building still shows the failures of security cooperation. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, institutional capacity-building initiatives are to be “driven by U.S. interests and values” but at the same time avoid “the projection or imposition of United States’ models, which may not fit an ally or partner’s specific context.” How can institutional capacity-building be driven by U.S. values while also not be driven by U.S. models? Often Americans sent to help build institutions are subject-matter experts in developing and running logistics systems, human resource institutions, and other formal defense institutions in the United States, not state-building or political development scholars with a deep understanding of the informal politics of the state. These gaps in knowledge are then filled in by their experience in running institutions in the United States, resulting in foreign defense institutions modeled on the complex American bureaucratic system, a system rooted in rational legitimacy. Additionally, institutional capacity programs are often aimed at improving the skills of functionaries and/or rewriting laws, processes, or regulations that improve the veneer of the neo-patrimonial system without necessarily shifting governance style further down the legal continuum. This veneer serves to further enhance a leader’s international legitimacy while doing nothing to improve their domestic legitimacy, to say nothing of the standard of living of the country’s citizens. Security cooperation observers may point to Ukraine as an example of successful security cooperation, with the United States providing military assistance to deny Russia an easy win, and so far it seems to be working. Observers did not expect Ukraine to do so well against Russia. However, this is the exception that proves the rule. Ukraine by most measures is not a deeply fragile state. In fact, according to the fragile state index, where a lower number indicates less fragility, it has ranked anywhere from 86 to as low as 117 out of 179 countries. Currently, about 88 out of 179 countries are deemed more fragile than Ukraine. Compared to countries like the Philippines, Nigeria, Egypt, Afghanistan, Iraq, and many African countries, it was relatively more stable. Second, American defense articles and services are being used to fight off an external threat. Third, government legitimacy is not in question. The reason that security cooperation is “working” is that Ukrainian citizens see the government as trying to provide them with protection against the Russian invasion: They see an arrangement in which they (the Ukrainians) are giving their blood, with much of the treasure being provided by the United States. After the war, Ukraine may come out with a stronger nation-state identity and perhaps a less corrupt government. In addition, following the path identified by Charles Tilly, becoming efficient and effective at war contributes to moving states further down the legal legitimacy continuum. The issue with many fragile states, especially in African countries, is that their citizens see a variety of actors as legitimate governors, not the central government. In turn, often, governments of fragile states see their own citizens and groups as potential political rivals, not communities to be served. Some fragile states are only states because international society says so, not because their citizens believe them to be, unlike in Ukraine. Engaging in security cooperation in fragile countries is a wicked problem, in that any approach the United States takes will invariably not be good enough to achieve the lofty goals outlined in the National Security Strategy. When the United States helps to build foreign militaries it cannot help but use an American model, one that also assumes an objective control of civil-military relations, which neo-patrimonial regimes do not follow. Political leaders in fragile states will gladly take whatever military training and equipment that the United States is willing to give while also ensuring they can still hold on to power, through various forms of patronage and/or coup-proofing. In addition, Chinese and Russian military and economic assistance is waiting in the wings to supplement or even supplant American assistance. Suggestions to tie continued U.S. security cooperation to improvement in domestic conditions may not work, as fragile states often use the threat of going to Russia or China to gain concessions. U.S. policymakers need to rethink their approach to security cooperation by first deciding whether keeping Russia and China out is enough of a national interest to justify providing support to specific fragile states. Despite great-power competition, U.S. interests may be best served by abandoning security-cooperation efforts in fragile states. Arguments to improve the foreign military sales process or incentivize a country’s behavior are largely irrelevant and will not lead to better security cooperation outcomes, at least not within the timelines imposed by U.S. government programs. It is very difficult to build a sustainable military capacity in fragile countries whose governments lack resources, both monetary and human, and to do so against the desires of political leaders who may see keeping institutions weak as a way to stay in power. The United States should only choose to conduct security cooperation, especially if paid for by taxpayer dollars — because not all programs are, and some are funded by the foreign governments themselves — in very specific cases that truly serve national interests. U.S. policymakers should also be prepared for the fallout that comes with increasing military capacity in states that cannot provide basic needs for their own population or have governments that lack legitimacy, namely human-rights abuses, corruption, and general regional instability. When the United States does choose to pour millions of taxpayer dollars into the security sector of a fragile state, it should be ready to make a long-term commitment and embed any approach in both the formal and informal political structures of the state.

#### Democracy solves a laundry list of impacts---economic growth, public goods, alliances, and war---the US is key.

Lee ’18 (Carrie; is an assistant professor at the U.S. Air War College and a Security Fellow with Truman National Security Project. Any views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, Air University, or Truman National Security Project; *The Truman Project*; September 10th; “Why Democracy Promotion is in the Strategic Interest of the United States”; [https://medium.com/truman-doctrine-blog/why-democracy-promotion-is-in-the-strategic-interest-of-the-united-states-ae959c111b2f](about:blank); accessed 7/9/19; MSCOTT)

However, reducing the United States’ emphasis on a values-driven foreign policy is wrong, and contrary to the strategic interests of the United States. Democracy promotion in particular serves a key role in safeguarding U.S. interests and promoting global, long-term growth in ways fundamentally compatible with U.S. strategic interests. After all, democracies protect private property in important ways, invest in public goods, are more politically stable, make for more dependable allies, and empirically do not go to war with one another. Ultimately, a world full of democratic governments is safer, more prosperous, and more stable — all states of being that the United States has an interest in promoting.

Democracy guarantees that the public has a stake in its own institutions and government, which leads to investor confidence and growth. Since elected politicians are accountable to property owners and are held in check by an independent judiciary, democracies tend to have better mechanisms for protecting private property than their autocratic counterparts. This makes democracies a particularly attractive type of country for investors — both public and private — because checks and balances make it difficult for the state to nationalize industries. Further, private property rights protected by the legal system encourage entrepreneurship and small business development, both of which are key to a growing and modernizing economy. As a result, democracies tend to be wealthier and more economically stable than their autocratic counterparts. This is fundamentally in the interest of the United States in that both private and public investors have an interest in seeing returns on their investments, thereby potentially making countries less willing to go to war if that would require severing economic ties. Democratic institutions ensure that citizens with both economic and political power are heard.

Democracies also invest in public goods at much higher rates than autocratic governments. Because politicians must cater to the median voter, they approve policies that invest in public education and healthcare, both of which promote long-term growth and development. Public education invests in a country’s human capital, setting the stage for long-term innovation, adaptability, and advancement. Public healthcare, meanwhile, has been shown to increase overall societal productivity and well-being as people take fewer sick days, citizens are able to afford their healthcare without going bankrupt, and ultimately, the overall costs of healthcare are driven down as citizens become healthier. Productive, innovative societies are also better for the United States — innovation around the world improves global quality of life, results in more educational and vocational opportunities for Americans (both because other universities and jobs become more attractive to Americans who want to go abroad and because potential immigrants are more likely to want to stay in their own country, opening up opportunities for U.S. citizens at home), and may reduce friction between countries over resources and labor.

Democracies are also generally more politically stable because regular election cycles ensure an established process for the habitual and peaceful removal of leaders from power. Elections ensure the non-violent transition of power and reduce the need for mass protest, rioting, and revolution — which makes countries more politically stable. Further, when citizens are granted rights and protections from government abuse, enforced by an independent judiciary, they have fewer grievances against the government and are thus less able to mobilize large numbers of people to violently overthrow the regime. Revolution, while not always violent, often leads to political instability, challenges to growth, increased incentives for diversionary war and conflict, and oftentimes civil war. The externalities of civil war and international conflict then put pressure on the United States to intervene, protect human rights, and otherwise expend resources on other countries’ issues. Further, civil wars are highly destructive to institutions, human capital, and resources, and can have significant security spillover effects, increasing global risk of political instability and violent extremism.

This political stability, in addition to institutional checks and balances, makes democracies better international partners and allies in the long-term. Treaties ratified by multiple branches of government are more durable than executive agreements signed by a single leader who may be replaced within a short period of time. While democracies may be more reluctant to commit to alliances and formal security pacts, once a party to them, they are more dependable than other states with concentrated power at the executive level. These kind of durable commitments are of interest to the United States as it seeks to preserve the liberal world order; it is far more effective to ally with partners whose institutions make withdrawal from the alliance costly.

Finally, it has been empirically observed that democracies do not go to war with one another. While there is a robust debate around the exact nature of the so-called “democratic peace,” it appears that there are qualities particular to democracies that make war between them particularly unlikely: a dovish public constrains leaders’ ability to wage war, competitive elections and a free press make it easier to credibly communicate resolve to potential adversaries, consolidated democracies tend to be more wealthy and economically interdependent, like-minded people are more hesitant to wage war against one another, and so on. Regardless of the precise mechanisms, however, a world of democracies is inherently safer, more prosperous, and less likely to initiate a war against the United States — a key factor in protecting American security and interests.

### DSCA 2AC – Thumpers Galore

#### DSCA action in Europe turns the DA—signals global strength

Reuters 22, 7-22-2022, "U.S. State Dept. approves $2 billion in arms sales to four countries," No Publication, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/us-state-dept-approves-2-billion-in-arms-sales-to-four-countries/article65668262.ece

The sale comes as governments around the world are watching Russia's invasion of Ukraine and grow more willing to invest in weapons systems The U.S. State Department has approved the potential sale of more than $2 billion worth of arms and equipment, including Patriot missiles for the Netherlands, cruise missiles for Australia, and oceanographic observation equipment for the United Arab Emirates, the Pentagon said on Thursday. The sale comes as governments around the world are watching Russia's invasion of Ukraine and grow more willing to invest in weapons systems. The package for the Netherlands would include 96 Patriot ballistic missiles and related equipment, the Pentagon said. If finalized, Raytheon Technologies would be the prime contractor for the deal, which could be worth as much as $1.2 billion. Australia was approved to buy 80 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles, or extended-range cruise missiles. Made by Lockheed Martin Corp, the missiles can be launched from F/A-18 Super Hornets and F-35s. That deal could be worth as much as $235 million. The United Arab Emirates was approved to buy an oceanographic observation equipment system which includes multisite sensors and remote data collection facilities for a total cost of $206 million. Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for that system. The State Department also authorized the sale of as much as $397 million worth of various Raytheon- and Lockheed-made munitions to Kuwait. The weapons include air-to-air missiles, bombs, and kits that make bombs more precise and lethal. The Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of the possible sale on Thursday.Despite approval by the State Department, the notification does not indicate that a contract has been signed or that negotiations have concluded.

#### Idk but 127 million to belgium seems like more than the plan

Costas Pitas 22, 7-19-2022, "U.S. approves sales of $127 million of F-16 equipment to Belgium," https://www.reuters.com/world/us-approves-sales-127-million-f-16-equipment-belgium-2022-07-19/

The U.S. State Department has green-lighted the potential sale of F-16 sustainment and related equipment worth $127 million to Belgium, the Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Agency said on Tuesday. "This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a NATO ally which is an important force for political stability and economic progress in Europe," it said in a statement.

#### UAE sales thump

Naomi Cooper 22, 7-22-2022, "State Department OKs $206M Oceanographic Observation Equipment FMS to UAE," ExecutiveBiz, https://blog.executivebiz.com/2022/07/state-department-oks-206m-oceanographic-observation-equipment-sale-to-uae/

The State Department has granted the UAE government approval to buy oceanographic observation equipment and associated system under a potential $206 million foreign military sale contract. Lockheed Martin’s rotary and mission system division has been named the principal for the proposed deal, which includes fiber optic communications suites, remote data collection facilities, multi-site sensors, data analysis workstations and power supplies, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency said Thursday. The UAE also requested technical and logistics support and other related services under the FMS deal, which will provide the country with access to real-time oceanographic data to protect natural resources, maritime boundaries and ports. The potential contract calls for the deployment of two contractor representatives to the UAE for a period of two and a half years. DSCA does not expect the sale to alter the basic military balance in the region.

### DSCA 2AC – AT: Link

#### Plan not DSCA

DSCA ND "Chapter 1," No Publication, https://samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-1

The Secretary of Defense establishes military requirements and implements programs to transfer defense articles and services to eligible foreign countries and international organizations. Within DoD, the principal responsible agencies for Security Cooperation (SC) are the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the Combatant Commands (CCMDs), the Joint Staff, the Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs), and the Military Departments (MILDEPs).

#### O&M and different implementing agencies mean no link to the DA

**McInnis and Lucas 15** (Kathleen McInnis is an analyst in international security, Nathan Lucas is a section research manager, “What Is ‘Building Partner Capacity?’ Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, 12-18-15, Accessed on 7-22-19, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf>, DP)

Security assistance, by contrast, is defined as a group of programs authorized by Title 22 of the U.S. Code, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease, in furtherance of national policies and objectives.17

Security assistance is a subset of security cooperation, 18 and BPC, in its current formulation, appears to be associated with those security cooperation and assistance activities designed to enable weakened or fragile states to manage their own security challenges. Although all DOD aspects of security assistance programs are administered by DSCA, the agency is not responsible for the department’s broader strategy and non-programmatic elements of security cooperation or building partner capacity.19

As with all federal agencies, DSCA allocates its resources according only to the authorities Congress has provided. The authorities associated with security cooperation and security assistance are often described as a “patchwork” of authorities and programs, only some of which are exclusively within DOD’s purview. Others are either (1) managed by the State Department, (2) managed by the State Department and executed by DOD (such as Foreign Military Sales programs), or (3) jointly managed by the State Department and DOD, requiring both departments’ concurrence to authorize specific activities. Table 2 depicts some of the key programs and authorities in the security assistance toolkit, including from where each program derives its legal authority.

Examining Table 2, one could make two observations. First, after the 9/11 attacks, the number of security assistance programs proliferated. Of the 31 programs listed above 17 were created after 9/11, suggesting that the United States government believed that its traditional, pre-9/11 security assistance portfolio was necessary but insufficient to meet the challenges of an increasingly interdependent and complex world. Second, the majority of these programs established after 9/11 were additional authorities given to the Department of Defense, suggesting that DOD plays a greater role in security cooperation today than the one it historically played. The latter observation is borne out by the current manifestations of BPC across the DOD’s activities. Although the programs and authorities listed above are the focus of most analysis and discussion with respect to BPC, they do not capture the full extent of DOD’s activities and expenditures in this area. This is because DOD has integrated BPC—in its various guises and manifestations (security cooperation, assistance, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, and so on)—across a wide range of its operations and activities (see “DOD Activities That Build Partner Capacity”). In order to do so, different DOD components utilize a variety of funding sources. For example, according to a 2013 RAND study, rather than using DSCA earmarked funds for specific activities with partners, Most [BPC] programs are funded by other, less narrow [funding] sources, such as operations and maintenance funds. Examples include exercises overseen by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military-to-military contacts, which are often (but not always) funded by Traditional COCOM Activity Authority. In each of these cases, DoD uses a specific authority to use its operations and maintenance funds for a given security cooperation activity. In some cases, these funds are then reimbursed, but more often than not, the security cooperation activity comes at the expense of another defense priority.20

### BBB 2AC – UQ

#### BBB is dead until midterms at leads – Manchin funding opposition

Budryk 7-14 – *reporter at the Hill* (Zack, 7-14-2022, "Manchin will not support climate spending in reconciliation package," Hill, https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/3560404-manchin-will-not-support-climate-spending-in-reconciliation-package-reports/)//KH

Sen. Joe **Manchin** (D-W.Va.) **will not support climate spending** as part of a reconciliation package, likely dooming any major climate legislation before the 2022 midterms, a Democrat briefed on the conversation confirmed to The Hill Thursday night.

The West Virginia Democrat told Democratic leaders on Thursday that he was unwilling to support a spending package with either climate provisions or new tax increases on corporations or wealthy individuals.

Manchin said last December that he would not back the $2 trillion Build Back Better package, which included major climate provisions, seemingly killing its chances in the 50-50 Senate. Since then, Manchin has returned to the negotiating table with both Senate Majority Leader Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) and a bipartisan group of senators.

Manchin had previously expressed doubt about new spending Wednesday following the report that **inflation surged 9.1 percent** over the last year, the highest annual rate since 1981. Following the release of the report, the centrist senator suggested he was only sold on a proposal to reduce prescription drug prices.

“We know what we can pass is basically the drug pricing, OK? — on Medicare,” Manchin told reporters Wednesday. “Is there any more we can do? I don’t know but I am very, very cautious.”

The reported stalemate comes less than four months ahead of the 2022 midterms. Should Democrats lose their slim majority in one or both houses of Congress, Manchin’s announcement would likely **close the door on any new climate spending** for the remainder of Biden’s term. Progressives and environmental activists have faulted what they have said is Biden’s overly cautious approach to climate issues, and said it risks dampening voter enthusiasm among many of the voters who elected him in 2020.

The Hill has reached out to Manchin and Schumer’s offices for comment, as well as the Senate Energy and Public Works Committee, which Manchin chairs.

### BBB 1NC – UQ

#### Build Back Better will pass with razor-thin margins next week

UBS 7-22 – *global wealth management service* (UBS Editorial, 7-22-2022, "Washington: Tech push, climate change, and Build Back Better," global, https://www.ubs.com/global/en/wealth-management/our-approach/marketnews/article.1570692.html)//KH

Build Back Better Revival. Senate Democrats behind the scenes continue to work on navigating their slimmed-down Build Back Better (BBB) legislation through the complicated rules of budget reconciliation, which will allow them to pass the bill with just 50 votes (instead of the de facto 60 vote threshold that applies to most legislation in the Senate). We expect the final BBB bill to be considered by the Senate beginning the week of August 1. It will take that entire week (and possibly the next) to reach a conclusion. The smaller BBB most notably would include prescription drug pricing reforms that will allow Medicare to achieve cost savings for the government. Those savings will be applied to an extension of federal subsidies under Obamacare. There may be a few other provisions that are not controversial, but importantly, we do not expect any tax increases on wealthier individuals or businesses to be included in this bill (unlike earlier versions). While the smaller bill is no doubt a disappointment to many Democrats who still favor the $1.75 trillion bill passed by the House last fall, it still will be a **major accomplishment** for Democrats to tout to voters this year if it can pass in the Senate, which we **believe is likely.**